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Colson: West Virginia Divorce Law

WEST VIRGINIA DIVORCE LAW
Clyde L. ColsonO
I.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PROCEDURE

In West Virginia the circuit courts, sitting in chancery, have
sole jurisdiction to grant divorces.' It should be noted, however,
that this jurisdiction is not part of the inherent jurisdiction of
equity, but is based entirely on statute. This being true, in order
to maintain an action for divorce it is necessary to show that all
the statutory requirements as to jurisdiction have been met and
that there have been no violations of the strict limitations imposed
by the legislature to prevent the growth of a divorce racket in
this state. As was said by the West Virginia court:
"The courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain
divorce cases only by reason of the statute conferring that
jurisdiction. Such cases do not fall within their general
equitable powers. They are governed by the statute as to
jurisdictional facts, and it is well within legislative power to
throw strict safeguards around judicial severance of the mar.
riage contract." 2
Consequently, the lawyer should thoroughly acquaint himself with
the provisions of our statute in regard to these limitations. In view
of the rather sweeping changes which have recently been made
in this respect, there is little to be gained by an examination of
the cases. It would seem t6 be more advantageous to examine the
salient provisions of the statute itself.
It was formerly provided that "in no case shall a suit for
divorce be maintainable unless the plaintiff be an actual bona fide
citizen of this state."' The court, however, held that under this
provision an unnaturalized foreign-born resident, domiciled in this
state, could sue for divorce. 4 As a result of this construction the
revised statute is framed solely in terms of the "residence" rather
than the citizenship of the partiesY Note, however, that when it
is said in the statute that one of the parties must be "a bona fide
resident of this state", obviously what is meant is that he not only
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 6.
2 White v. White, 106 W. Va. 569, 570, 146 S. E. 376 (1929).
3 W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c.64, § 7.
4 Vachikinas v. Vachikinas, 91 W. Va. 181, 112 S. E. 316 (1922).
5W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 8.
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must satisfy the requirement as to residence but must also be
domiciled here. As was said by our court in construing a similar
provision of the former statute,
"It is the domicil of one or both of the parties in this
state, at the time of suit, that gives jurisdiction under our
statutes."0
Consequently, for the sake of accuracy in the following discussion
both the requirements of domicil and residence will be mentioned
in every case.
In determining whether a suit for divorce may be brought
under the present statute, three things must be considered: (1)
the ground for divorce, (2) whether the cause of action arose at
a time when one of the parties was resident and domiciled in this
state, and (3) whether the defendant can be personally served
within the state.7
First, consider a case in which the ground for divorce is
adultery. Whether the cause of action arose in or out of this state,
if either of the parties is at the commencement of the suit resident
and domiciled within the state, and if the defendant can be personally served with process in this state, suit for divorce may be
brought at once, there being in this case no requirement as to a
period of residence here on the part of either plaintiff or defendant.8 It should also be noted that in such case it is immaterial
whether the cause of action arose before or after one of the parties
became a domiciled resident of the state. The only limitation in
respect to the time when the cause of action arose is found in the
provision that no divorce shall be granted on the ground of
adultery which occurred more than three years before the institution of the suit.9
On the other hand, when resort must be had to constructive
service either by publication or by personal service outside the
state,10 it becomes necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy a requirement as to his period of residence here. This applies not only to
suits for divorce on the ground of adultery but to all divorce
actions in which it is impossible to obtain personal service on the
0 Carty v. Carty, 70 W. Va. 146, 150, 73 S. E. 310 (1911).

7W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 8. See Revisers' Note for a similar discussion of the statute.
8 d. § 8(a).
9Id. § 14.
1l Id. c. 48, art. 2, § 10, and c. 56, art. 3, §§ 23-30, in regard to constructive

service.
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defendant within the state. In such a case, the residence and
domicil of the plaintiff when the cause of action arose is of importance. If at the time the cause of action arose the plaintiff
was a domiciled resident of this state, it is necessary that he should
have been so for only one year prior to the commencement of the
suit. On the other hand, if when the cause of action arose he was
not a domiciled resident of this state, it is then necessary for him
to show that he has become and has continued to be such a resident
for at least two years prior to the bringing of the suit."
Consider, next, cases in which a divorce is sought on some
ground other than adultery. In all such cases it is of importance
to determine whether one of the parties was a domiciled resident
of this state at the' time the cause of action arose. If at that time
either the plaintiff or the defendant was resident and domiciled in
this state, suit may be brought if he has been so resident and
domiciled for at least one year prior to the commencement of the
suit. 2 In thus providing for a divorce action when the defendant
can satisfy the residence and domicil requirement, a radical departure was made from the former rule in this state under which
the residence and domicil of the plaintiff alone was the deciding
factor. 13 If, on the other hand, at the time the cause of action
arose neither of the parties was a domiciled resident of this state,
it is necessary that one of them should have established his domicil
in this state and should have resided here for at least two years
prior to the commencement of the suit. And in such case there is
the further alternative requirement that it be shown either (1)
that the alleged ground for divorce was a recognized ground for
an absolute divorce in the state which was the residence at the
time the cause of action arose of the party whose domicil and
residence here gives our court jurisdiction, or (2) that the cause
of action arose more than five years before the filing of the bill."
The obvious purpose of these latter restrictions is to discourage the
establishment of a domicil here for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, although the privilege of so doing is not wholly abolished.
11Id. e. 48, art. 2, § 8(c).
12Id. § 8(b).
13"W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 64, § 7; White v. White, 106 W. Va. 569,
146 S. E. 376 (1929) (statute applied).
14W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 8(c). Query whether the phrase
"the jurisdiction in which such party resided at the time the cause of action
arose" refers to domicil alone, to residence alone, or to both.
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In this state the venue of a divorce suit is the same as the
venue of an action to annul or affirm a marriage." Consequently,
in the discussion of this section of the code both types of suit will
be dealt with."6 The only situation in which there is any difference
in the rules as to venue in divorce and annulment suits is found
in the provision that
"In the case of a suit to annul a marriage performed in
this State, where neither party is a resident of the State, the
suit shall be brought in the county where the marriage was
performed."17
In determining the venue of other annulment suits and of all
divorce suits, it is important to know whether the defendant resides in this state. If the defendant is a resident, the plaintiff
has his option to sue either in the county where the defendant
resides, or in the county where the parties last cohabited. On the
other hand, if the defendant is not a resident, then suit must be
brought in the county in which the plaintiff resides.' 8
No difficulty has arisen in the application of this section of
the statute except in respect to the construction of the phrase "in
the county in which the parties last cohabited." Construing this
provision in Jennings v. McDougle, the court said:
"The phrase, 'in the county in which the parties last cohabited', used in the statute, necessarily means the place where
the parties ceased to live together as husband and wife in
the same house, and ordinarily carries with it the idea of a
substantial measure of temporal continuity."19
Consequently,
"The mere allegation of separation, abandonment,
desertion and refusal of cohabitation in Wood County, an allegation relied on as the legal equivalent of an allegation of
.falls far short . . . The
the last actual cohabitation .....
place of separation, abandonment, desertion and refusal of
cohabitation and the place of the cessation of cohabitation
mId. § 9.
-OIn a former article on West Virginia Marriage Law (1936) 43 W. VA.
L. Q. 33, the matter of the venue of annulment suits was left for treatment
here.
17 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e.48, art. 2, § 9; Titus v. Titus, 115 W. Va. 229,
174 S. E. 874 (1934) (statute applied). It should be recalled that such case
no annulment suit may be brought if the parties have established a matrimonial
domicil elsewhere. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 7.

isId. § 9.

19 83 W. Va. 186, 190, 98 S. E. 162 (1919).
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by husband and wife need not necessarily be and frequently
,,20
are not in the same county ....
In regard to procedure, the statute provides that divorce suits
"shall be instituted and conducted as other chancery suits except
as provided in this article."'" The more important exceptions are
found in the provision that
"All pleadings shall be verified by the party in whose
name they are filed; but the bill shall not be taken for confessed, and whether the defendant answers or not, the case
shall be tried and heard independently of the admissions of
either party in the pleadings or otherwise.... 122
Under this provision it is obvious that the material allegations in
respect to the ground for divorce cannot be taken for confessed,
but must be supported by competent proof.2 3 Similarly, the
necessary jurisdictional facts cannot be established by the allegations of the bill admitted in answer.24 Note, however, that in
thus placing emphasis on the necessity of proof, it should not be
overlooked that a bill may also be defective for failure to allege
material facts. As was said by the court in Jennings v. McDougle,
"It is well settled that facts necessary to the conferring of jurisdiction in a divorce suit must be pleaded as well as proved", 2"
and the same is of course true in respect to other material facts.2"
Jennings v. McDougle also illustrates the proposition that under
the rule which requires pleadings to be verified, all amendments
must be verified too. In its discussion of this point the court said:
"To hold otherwise would enable a party by amendment
to incorporate in a bill already sworn to certain facts essential
to his case to which he may not be willing to give the sanction
of an oath.
Thus the whole purpose of verification could be
27
defeated."2o Ibid.
21 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931)
22 Ibi.

c. 48, art. 2, § 11.

23 Chapman v. Chapman, 70 W. Va. 522, 524, 74 S. E. 661 (1912) (bill
may not be taken for confessed); Hatfield v. Hatfield, 109 W. Va. 212, 216, 153
S. E. 493 (1930) (same as to cross-bill).
24 Marcum v. Marcum, 113 W. Va. 374, 377-378, 168 S. E. 389 (1933).
25 83 W. Va. 186, 196, 98 S. E. 162 (1919). Accord: Parks v. Parks. 109
W. Va. 138, 140-141, 153 S. E. 242 (1930).
20 "Of course, if . . . . the specific facts alleged do not constitute cruel
and inhuman treatment, the bill would be bad on demurrer."
Deusenberry
v. Deusenberry, 82 W. Va. 135, 136, 95 S. E. 665 (1918). And see Trough
v. Trough, 59 W. Va. 464, 465-466, 53 S. E. 630, 4 L. R. A. (x.s.) 1185

(1906).

27 83 W. Va. 186, 191, 98 S. E. 162 (1919).
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The rule that material allegations must be alleged and proved
and may not be taken for confessed is supplemented by the further
provision that "no decree shall be granted on the uncorroborated
testimony of the parties or either of them." 28 The obvious purpose of these requirements is to lessen the chance that the parties
may obtain a divorce through collusion. As a further safeguard in
this connection the statute also provides for the appointment, in
the court's discretion, of a divorce commissioner whose duty it
is to investigate all divorce suits, to appear at all trials and
examine witnesses when necessary to defend the interests of the
state and generally to "take all necessary steps to prevent fraud
and collusion in divorce cases." 29 Thus, on the theory that the
state is an interested party in all divorce actions,"" provision is
made for the appointment of counsel to represent the state. If
no divorce commissioner is appointed, it is of course incumbent
upon the court to see to it that the interests of the state are protected.
Due to an ambiguity in the statute some confusion in respect
to the divorce commissioner has arisen in practice. The statute
provides that the court may in its discretion "appoint a competent
attorney in each county as a commissioner in chancery, to investigate divorce cases, who shall be designated as 'divorce commissioner'."' This language becomes ambiguous in light of the fact
that provision is also made for another sort of commissioner in
divorce cases. In one section of the statute it is stated that a suit
for divorce may be tried before the court in chambers or may be
referred "to a commissioner in chancery, or a special commissioner,
as hereinafter provided' .32 It becomes apparent, upon an examination of the subsequent section, 33 that the commissioner here referred to is simply a master in chancery whose duty it is to make
and report findings of fact to the court. In view of the great difference in the nature of the duties to be performed by the divorce
commissioner and by the master in chancery, there would seem
to be little ground for confusion. But the fact that in the statute
each is referred to as a "commissioner in chancery" has led to
the practice in some circuits of referring cases to the divorce com2SW.
WVA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 11.
29 Id. § 24.
3o Wass v. Wass, 41 W. Va. 126, 23 S. E. 537 (1895).

31 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 24.
32 Id. § 23 as amended by W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 35, § 23.
33 Id. § 26.
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missioner as a special commissioner to take and hear the evidence.
Recognizing that this was not good practice, the Revisers of the
Code in 1931 suggested that the matter be cleared up by abolishing the office of divorce commissioner and by denying the court
the option of referring divorce cases to a master, but this suggestion was not adopted.3 4 While the legislature may have been
right in questioning the advisability of the cure suggested, it is
most unfortunate that this ambiguity was not corrected. By making
no change in the statute, the legislature impliedly sanctioned the
indefensible practice of allowing the divorce commissioner, who is
really one of the attorneys engaged in the trial of the case, to act
as a master in chancery. Fortunately this practice is not widespread, but to remove the confusion which does exist the statute
should be amended so as to show clearly that one individual may
not serve in the two capacities.
Note that in case the trial is to be held by the court, the plaintiff is required before trial to give the divorce commissioner, if
one has been appointed, at least thirty days' notice in writing. 3
On the other hand, if the case is referred to a master, he must
give the parties and the divorce commissioner, if any, at least ten
days' notice of the time and place at which the hearing will begin 5

II.

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

A. In General
There being no common law of divorce in the United States,
divorces may be granted only on grounds established by the legislature." As was said by the West Virginia court,
"The divorce statute of this state .... fully, completely
and comprehensively covering and dealing with its subject
matter, is not merely amendatory of other laws; wherefore
it alone is to be resorted to for the grounds or causes for
divorce. 8
See Revisers' Notes, Committee's Notes and Legislative Notes in W. VA.
§§ 23-27.
3r Id. § 25 as amended by Acts 1935, c. 35, § 25. However, substantial compliance with this provision is allthat is required. Marcum v. Marcum, 113 W.
Va. 374, 168 S. E. 389 (]933).
36 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 27 as amended by Acts 1935,
c. 35, § 27.
34

REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2,

37 MADDEN, PESoNS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS
at 263.
38

(1931) 256-263, particularly

Boger v. Boger, 86 W. Va. 590, syl. 1, 104 S. E. 49 (1920).
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This being true, the rather sweeping revision which the West
Virginia divorce statutes have recently undergone serves to make
not untimely a summary survey of the law in this field.
Until quite recently our statute made provision not only for
an absolute divorce or a divorce from the bond of matrimony 9 but
also for a limited divorce, commonly called a divorce from bed and
board.4" In 1935, however, the provisions in respect to divorces
from bed and board were repealed,41 and with one exception having
to do with abandonment or desertion, what was formerly ground
only for a divorce from bed and board was made ground for an
absolute divorce. 42 Before 1935 an absolute divorce could be
granted for abandonment or desertion only if the desertion was
continued for a period of three years, while a limited divorce
could be granted on this ground without regard to the duration
of the desertion. When the statute was amended the right to a
divorce for abandonment alone was abolished, but the period during
which the desertion must continue in order to be ground for an
absolute divorce was reduced to two years.
In respect to decrees for limited divorce entered prior to the
passage of the act, the amended statute allows a revocation of the
decree in the event of a reconciliation and also provides that the
decree may be "made final in the manner prescribed by the code
of West Virginia." 4 3 The provision quoted seems to be a rather
awkward method of incorporating by reference and thus reenacting the appropriate provisions of the amended section. In
amending other parts of the statute, however, the legislature
adopted the better procedure of expressly enacting the whole section with the necssary changes included.
B. Specific Grounds
1. Aduitery. Although adultery is ground for divorce 4 4 and
is also punishable as a crime,C neither the legislature nor the court
of West Virginia seems to have defined the term. For the purpose
of this discussion it is enough to say that adultery is the voluntary
sexual intercourse of a married person with one other than the ofs9

W. VA. Ruv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art.

40Id.
41 W.
42Id.
43 Id.

§5.

Va. Acts 1935, c. 35.
§ 4.
§ 20.

44'W.VA. REV. CODE (1931)

2, § 4.

c. 48, art. 2, § 4(a).

45 Id. c. 61, art. 8, § 3.
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fender's husband or wife.48 From the requirement that the act be
voluntary it follows that intercourse under coercion, as in the case
of rape, or during insanity is not adultery and hence is not ground
for divorce, but it is adultery if one has intercourse while voluntarily intoxicated.

47

Aside from these questions, none of which have arisen in West
Virginia, as to whether an admitted act of intercourse is adultery,
the law in respect to this ground for divorce is clear and fairly
easy of application. The only real difficulty is the practical one of
proof. In the very nature of things, there seldom being an eye..
witness, it is usually necessary to resort to circumstantial evidence
in order to prove the commission of adultery. As was said by our
court in one case,
"Adultery is peculiarly a crime of darkness and secrecy;
parties are rarely surprised at it; and so it not only may, but
ordinarily must, be established by circumstantial evidence."8
Of course, the defendant and his or her paramour are in a
position to give direct testimony. As a practical matter, however,
they are usually reluctant to testify and because of the incriminatory nature of their testimony they could not be compelled to do
so. On the other hand, even if they are willing to testify, their evidence alone is not very satisfactory. As for the paramour, if he be
credible, his uncorroborated testimony may be sufficient, 49 but
courts naturally give little weight to such evidence. Discussing
this matter, the Kentucky court said:
"Witnesses, who testify to their own shame and degradation and especially those witnesses, who testify to unchaste acts with females have never been favorites of the
courts of justice .

.

. Such witnesses are invariably dis-

46 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY under "adultery", which see for further refinements
sometimes of value in criminal cases.
47
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 264; Stedman,
Adutery of Insane Wife (1918) 4 VA. L. REG. (N.s.) 248. Query whether
intercourse during a drunken stupor would be ground for divorce. Query also
as to the validity of the distinction, found in the cases and discussed by Madden, between intercourse under mistake of fact which is not adultery, and
under mistake of law which is. It would seem better to say that so long as the
mistake, whether of law or fact, is reasonable, there is no ground for divorce.
48 DeBerry v. DeBerry, 104 W. Va. 209, 211, 139 S. E. 710 (1927).
A
reference to Murrin v. Murrin, 94 W. Va. 605, 613, 119 S. E. 812 (1923) shows
that the language which the court here makes its own was originally quoted
from BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DivoacE.
49 MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 47, at 266.
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credited and disbelieved in such cases, unless strongly corroborated. "60
As for the defendant, it is the general rule that a divorce for
adultery will not be granted on his uncorroborated admissions or
confessions.5' In West Virginia, however, under the statutory requirement that the case "be tried and heard independently of the
admissions of either party in the pleadings or otherwise,"2 the
defendant's confession is not even admissible in evidence."3 Note
that this statute, the purpose of which is to prevent the parties
from obtaining a collusive divorce, is applicable to admissions or
confessions not only of adultery but of all other marital misconduct. The fact that in the normal case of adultery the only direct
evidence is in this state either inadmissible or entitled to little
weight, fully substantiates the observation of the West Virginia
court that adultery not only may but ordinarily must be established by circumstantial evidence.
Due possibly to a feeling that circumstantial evidence is less
reliable than testimonial evidence,' 4 some confusion has arisen in
respect to the degree of proof necessary to establish adultery in
an action for divorce. Since a suit for divorce is a civil action, one
might suppose that all that is required is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 On the other hand, although it is a civil
action, it is one charging the commission of a criminal act, and
there is authority that the rule for criminal cases should apply
and that the adultery should be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.58 Probably a majority of the courts, however, take an
GoWesley v. Wesley, 181 Ky. 135, 144, 204 S. W. 165 (1918). See also Engleman v. Engleman, 97 Va. 487, 34 S. E. 50 (1899); of. DeBerry v. DeBerry,
104 W. Va. 209, 139 S. E. 710 (1927) where although the paramour testified
that he had intercourse with the defendant, the court treated the case as involving primarily a question as to the sufficiency of the corroborating circumstantial evidence.
51 A%.DEN, op. cit. szipra n. 47, at 266.
G2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 11.
63 Trough v. Trough, 59 W. Va. 454, 53 S. E. 630 (1906).
54 That our court has something of this sort in mind seems a reasonable
inference from its language: "To establish adultery, positive and direct
evidence is not required, but if it is sought to be dstablished by circumstantial
evidence, such evidence must be strong and clear ....

"

Vickers v. Vickers,

89 W. Va. 236, 240, 109 S. E. 234 (1921). As to the relative value of direct
and circumstantial evidence, however, see 1 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)

§ 26.
r That this is the general rule, see 5

WIGo10RE, EVIDENCE § 2498, 2(1-2);
Ellett v. Ellett, 157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861 (1911) (charge that evidence of
adultery must be "strong, convincing, and conclusive" held reversible error).
GoGray v. Gray, 100 N. J. Eq. 71, 135 Atl. 54 (1926).
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intermediate position and require that the proof be "clear and
satisfactory"7 or that it, be "clear, unequivocal and convincing. ',As accurate a statement as any of the principle followed by most
courts is found in the much quoted language of Lord Stowell in
Loveden v. Loveden to the effect that to warrant a finding that
adultery has been committed, "the circumstances must be such as
would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man
to the conclusion" of guilt." It is arguable that in these cases the
court is requiring no higher degree of proof than in other civil
cases. The more reasonable view, however, would seem to be that
while not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal
cases, something more is necessary than a mere preponderance of
the evidence."
It is not so easy to say which of the three positions has been
taken by the West Virginia court, there being some ground for
arguing that at one time or other it has adopted each view. In
Anderson v. Anderson the court said:
"True, as argued, it is not necessary, as in criminal
cases, to make out the case beyond a reasonable doubt, but it
is necessary for the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence." 1
However, it can hardly be said that in this case the court applied
the same rule as in other civil actions because not only did it say
in the same paragraph that "the evidence must be clear, positive
and satisfactory", but it was also found that the charge had not
been supported even by a preponderance of the evidence. Also in
Sharp v. Sharp where the court said it had "come to the conclusion that there is a preponderance of evidence" in support of the
charge,12 it was again stated that the evidence must be "clear and
positive". Thus it is seen that there is little basis for arguing that
it has ever been the rule in West Virginia that a mere preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to establish the charge of adultery.
7Marshall v. Marshall, 3 P. (2d) 344 (1925).
•sLang v. Lang, 155 Md. 464, 142 Atl. 485 (1928).
•-,9
2 Hagg. Const. 1, 3, 161 Eng. Rep. 648 (1810).
60 Cf. 5 WIGORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, 2(3), where it is recognized that a
stricter standard of proof is imposed by the phrase "clear and convincing
proof" as used in cases of fraud, undue influence, etc.
61 78 W. Va. 118, 123, 88 S. E. 653 (1916). But see 5 WIMOGRE, EVIDENcE
§ 2498, n. 10, where this case is used as an example of the application to a civil
action of the criminal law standard of proof.
62 91 W. Va. 678, 685, 114 S. E.280 (1922).
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In by far the greater number of cases the intermediate rule
was apparently adopted. In Miller v. Miller,3 though misquoting
the language of Lord Stowell in Loveden v. Loveden, the court correctly stated and seemingly approved the principle he applied in
that case. But the inference which might otherwise be drawn from
this case is somewhat weakened by the court's statement that it
"must take such evidence as the nature of the case permits . ..
weighing it with prudence and care, give effect to its just
and .
preponderance. "' There are, however, numerous cases in which
no mention is made of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
the court setting up some such standard as that the evidence must
be of a clear and positive nature or that it must be so clear and
strong as to carry conviction to the judicial mind. 5
On the basis of these cases one might suppose that in West
Virginia, as in most other states, the degree of proof required is
something less than that necessary in a criminal case but something
more than proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence. However, our court in its more recent discussions of this problem appears to have adopted a standard certainly as high, if not higher,
than that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Edwards v. Edwards the court said:
" .... no wife should be pronounced a violator of her
most solemn vows, unless upon evidence that will admit of no
other conclusion. There must be convincing proof." 60
This language has been quoted with approval in two subsequent
cases.17 Even before these decisions Wigmore was of the opinion
that our court demanded the same degree of proof in an action
for divorce on the ground of adultery as would be required in a
criminal case 88 However that may be, in light of this recent requirement that the evidence be so clear as to "admit of no other
o3 94 W. Va. 177, 180, 118 S. E. 137 (1923).
04 Id. at 181.
03 Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 700, 11 S. E. 12 (1890); Huff v. Huff,
73 W. Va. 330, 334, 80 S. E. 846 (1913); Nicely v. Nicely, 81 W. Va. 269,
277, 94 S. E. 749 (1917); Vickers v. Vickers, 89 W. Va. 236, 240, 109 S. E.
234 (1921); Schutte v. Schutte, 90 W. Va. 787, 793, 111 S. E. 840 (1922);
Murrin v. Murrin, 94 IV. Va. 605, 614, 119 S. E. 812 (1923); DeBerry v. DeBerry, 104 W. Va. 209, 211, 139 S. E. 710 (1927).
66 106 W. Va. 446, 456, 145 S. E. 813 (1928) (italics ours).
07 Criser v. Criser, 109 W. Va. 696, 699, 156 S. E. 84 (1930); Shook v. Shook,
111 W. Va. 284, 287, 161 S. E. 235 (1931).
08 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, n. 3 and n.10.
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conclusion," one cannot reasonably deny that at the present time
our court requires at least proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is little to be gained by a review of the circumstances
which have been held sufficient to establish the charge. Suffice it
to say that in the comparatively few cases in which the finding of
adultery was sustained, the evidence would "admit of no other
In fact, if attention is paid solely to the result
conclusion."
rather than to the language of the cases, Wigmore's conclusion
that our court has always required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt seems not unwarranted. It should be noted that while findings of fact by a trial chancellor will not ordinarily be disturbed
on appeal, the high degree of proof necessary to establish a charge
of adultery makes it more likely here than in other cases in equity
that upon a re-examination of the evidence a contrary finding will
be made by the appellate court.""
It is often stated that in order to prove adultery by circumstantial evidence not only must an opportunity be shown, but it
must also appear that the guilty party was of an adulterous disposition. 70 As was said by the West Virginia court in one case,
"It is well established that adultery may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must be clear and
positive, showing opportunity as to time and place to commit
the act, and a willingness on the part of the defendant." 71
Thus the mere fact that the defendant frequently visited a lady
of good reputation at her apartment, remaining several hours each
time, will not sustain a finding of adultery, there being no evidence
that the parties were adulterously inclined.72 On the other hand,
the adulterous disposition may be inferred from the nature of the
place visited by the defendant, as where he was seen at a house of
prostitution," or from the character of the corespondent, as where
the defendant had women of ill repute visit him at his home.74
Our court has never passed on the question as to the weight
which should be given in a divorce suit to the testimony of a hired
detective. The Virginia court, however, has adopted the general
rule that though such testimony will be carefully scrutinized it
0 Watson v. Watson, 112 W. Va. 77, 163 S. E. 768 (1932) ; Shook v. Shook,
111 W. Va. 284, 161 S. E. 235 (1931).
70 MADDEN, Op. cit. supra n. 47, at 266.
71 Sharp v. Sharp, 91 W. Va. 678, 683, 114 S. . 280 (1922).
72 Watson v. Watson, 112 W. Va. 77, 163 S. E. 768 (1932).
73 Shook v. Shook, 111 W. Va. 284, 161 S. E. 235 (1931).
74 Miller v. Miller, 94 W. Va. 177, 118 S. E. 137 (1923).
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should be weighed and considered like other testimony, and the
fact that the witness was paid to obtain the evidence is simply one
of the factors to be considered in determining his credibility. ",
That our court would probably follow this general rule may be
fairly inferred from this statement in Nicely v. Nicely:
"If Boso was in fact so employed ....the fact of such employment would certainly have an important bearing on the
value of his evidence .... "-,6
Note, however, that in this case the witness was not employed solely to obtain evidence of adultery, but according to the defendant
was to act as paramour in an effort to place her in a compromising
situation.
There remains for consideration a procedural problem as to
the particularity with which the alleged acts of adultery must be
set forth in the pleadings. In Anderson v. Anderson it was held
that a bill would be good on demurrer if it specified the time, the
place and the person with whom the alleged act of adultery was
committed, even though it failed to allege any of the other circumstances. 77 If the identity of the other party is not known, it is of
course sufficient if an allegation to that effect be made.78
(To be continued.)
ir Colbert v. Colbert, 162 Va. 393, 173 S. E. 660 (1934). For other authorities
see MADDEN, Op. cit. supra n. 47, at 267.
78 81 W. Va. 269, 275, 94 S.E. 749 (1917).
77 78 W. Va. 118, 88 S. B. 653 (1916).
78 See Shook v. Shook, 111 W. Va. 284, 285, 161 S. E. 235 (1931).
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